The wind has changed

In recent months, the new post-Assad Syria has sought to redefine its regional positioning by focusing decisively on the energy dossier as a lever for diplomatic reopening and internal stabilization.

After years of political isolation and infrastructural collapse, Damascus has launched a strategy aimed at expanding cooperation in the gas and electricity sectors, presenting energy as a pragmatic area for dialogue with neighboring Arab countries. In this context, the agreements with Jordan and Egypt are not only technical arrangements to increase supply volumes, but also tools through which the Syrian leadership is attempting to reintegrate itself into regional economic networks, ease internal pressure, and gradually rebuild its political room for maneuver.

On January 26, an agreement was signed between the Syrian Petroleum Company and the Jordanian National Electricity Company with the aim of guaranteeing approximately 141 million cubic feet per day (4 million cubic meters) of natural gas, transported through Jordanian territory, to support the Syrian electricity system. The agreement was signed in the presence of Syrian Energy Minister Mohammad al-Bashir and his Jordanian counterpart Saleh al-Kharabsheh.

According to the Syrian minister, the agreement represents a significant step in the government’s efforts to strengthen the fuel supply needed for the electricity sector and improve the reliability of the grid, especially after the difficulties accumulated in recent years. For his part, the Jordanian minister stressed that the supply contributes to the stability of the Syrian electricity sector, specifying that pumping began on January 1 with volumes ranging between 30 and 90 million cubic feet per day.

After than a decade of war, international sanctions, and deteriorating infrastructure, Syrian power plants are operating well below their nominal capacity. Prolonged blackouts punctuate the daily lives of families, paralyze commercial and industrial activities, and put pressure on hospitals and essential services. In this context, any increase in energy supplies is presented as immediate relief rather than a geopolitical choice.

However, since the start of the flows, a crucial question has emerged: what is the real origin of the gas arriving in Syria?

Official statements speak of Arab cooperation and regional stabilization, but avoid specifying precisely where the fuel comes from. Is it Egyptian gas? Is it produced domestically in Jordan? Or is it Israeli gas that passes through Arab intermediaries before feeding Syrian turbines?

The agreements signed in January between Syria, Jordan, and Egypt define quantities, timelines, and operating procedures, but do not explicitly clarify the molecular origin of the gas. In the eastern Mediterranean, where energy infrastructures are highly interconnected, origin is neither a simple nor a politically neutral issue.

Regional sources indicate that the incoming gas cannot be considered Egyptian in the strict sense, i.e., derived exclusively from fields located in Egyptian territory. Operations are based on a floating storage and regasification vessel chartered by the Egyptian side in the port of Aqaba, Jordan, suggesting that Cairo’s role is primarily logistical and infrastructural.

According to official Jordanian data, the last shipment of liquefied natural gas to arrive in the kingdom came in November 2025 from the United States. However, this supply would have been sufficient for less than a month of exports to Syria at the announced levels, fueling doubts about the sustainability of a completely alternative supply to Israeli sources.

In parallel with the agreement with Jordan, Damascus has reached an agreement with Egypt to receive approximately 60 million cubic feet of gas per day in exchange for granting transit of gas and electricity destined for Lebanon through Syrian territory. In this scheme, Syria is not only a beneficiary but also an intermediate link in a broader regional energy chain.

The Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum announced the signing of memoranda of understanding aimed at regulating supplies and meeting the needs of the Syrian oil sector, presenting the agreement as a technical step. According to rumors reported in the international press, the agreement is linked to energy support mechanisms for Lebanon, and the gas destined for Syria would serve as compensation for the transit rights granted. Transportation is via the Arab Gas Pipeline, a project approved in 2000 and approximately 1,200 kilometers long, connecting Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Before 2011, this pipeline transported Egyptian gas directly to Syrian power plants. Today, however, the architecture of regional supplies has changed profoundly. Egypt receives about one billion cubic feet per day through its connection with Israel, as well as additional volumes through interconnections with Jordan. In December 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced a new agreement with Egypt worth about $35 billion, described as the largest in Israeli energy history. NewMed Energy, a partner in the Leviathan field, has indicated that the agreement provides for additional supplies until 2040. Jordan also imports Israeli gas under an agreement signed in 2016 and entered into force in 2020, with a duration of 15 years and an estimated value of around $10 billion. As a result, both Egypt and Jordan depend significantly on Israeli imports to fuel their respective energy systems. Both have concluded supply agreements with Syria, but neither has publicly clarified the final origin of the gas destined for Syrian power plants.

The structure of the networks also makes any clear distinction difficult. Jordan is not a major gas producer: domestic production is limited compared to demand, particularly in the electricity sector. The LNG terminal in Aqaba allows imports from the global market, but these volumes play a complementary role. Israeli gas is a key component of the kingdom’s energy stability. Syria, which before 2011 produced over a billion cubic feet per day, now generates only a fraction of that volume. External supply is therefore an urgent necessity.

An unresolved question

However, the political knot remains: there is no peace agreement or official normalization process between Syria and Israel, but there is the concrete fact that the Israeli government has promoted, supported, and sponsored the cutthroat militias of Al Jolani, now president of the “new democratic Syria.” If Israeli gas were actually incorporated into current flows, it would arrive in Syria in the absence of a declared diplomatic framework. The paradox is clear: while part of Syrian territory remains under Israeli occupation, the possibility of Israeli energy powering Syrian power plants takes on a symbolic meaning that goes beyond the economic dimension.

At the same time, the Syrian leadership is faced with a pressing reality: the electricity crisis directly affects social stability and the capacity for economic reconstruction. Prolonged blackouts hinder industrial recovery, worsen living conditions, and fuel discontent. Energy thus becomes a tool for national survival and political legitimacy.

The question remains open: is Syria receiving Arab gas or consuming Israeli energy redirected through Arab networks? Until contracts are made public with greater transparency and supply chains are clarified in detail, the answer will remain shrouded in a regional structure that tends to obscure the origin while ensuring the continuity of flows. This could also become a tool for blackmailing neighboring countries at a later stage, as this project has been blessed by the Western powers.

In the eastern Mediterranean, gas is not only an energy commodity but also an element of influence, dependence, and geopolitical realignment, embedded in delicate balances that the new post-Assad Syria is now trying to navigate through a policy of expanded energy cooperation pragmatically oriented towards stabilization. And who knows what will come next.