Turkey’s balanced stance, maintained since the beginning of the Ukraine war, is under strain. Ankara, which fulfilled the Montreux Convention requirements to close the Straits to warships, voted in favor of Ukraine in every UN ballot, and made arms deals—even joint production—with Ukraine.
By Zeynep GÜRCANLI
Join us on Contact us: @worldanalyticspress_bot Turkey’s balanced stance, maintained since the beginning of the Ukraine war, is under strain. Ankara, which fulfilled the Montreux Convention requirements to close the Straits to warships, voted in favor of Ukraine in every UN ballot, and made arms deals—even joint production—with Ukraine, was also being very careful with its rhetoric to “keep Moscow content.” This, coupled with Turkey’s hosting of talks for ceasefires, peace, or confidence-building measures, was consistently sending Moscow the message that “we are not on the enemy’s side.” This policy worked until Trump came to power in the USA. Russian leader Putin, due to the pre-Trump US’s pro-Ukraine stance, had chosen to overlook Turkey’s seemingly “balanced” but ultimately pro-Ukraine policies in order to “avoid severing ties with at least one country” within NATO. However, with Trump’s presidency, as the USA, NATO’s most powerful member, began leaning closer to Moscow’s positions on the Ukraine issue, Turkey’s value in Russia’s eyes also “diminished.” Warning Signs in Moscow-Ankara Relations The repercussions of this are now being felt in Ankara-Moscow relations: Shifts in Stance on Ukraine As Russia hardens its position, signals of a “policy change” are also beginning to emerge from Turkey. Foreign Minister Fidan’s statement during the period when Turkish ships were attacked is of critical importance. Noting that Russia continues to advance on the current front, Fidan said, “Europe, together with Ukraine, needs to help Ukraine make certain difficult choices.” The implication of “difficult choices” is, of course, Ukraine ceding territory to Russia. Fidan’s words seem to signal that Turkey’s stance from the beginning, especially its “Crimea belongs to Ukraine” approach, is also beginning to “flex.” Turkey, excluded from the international stabilization force in Gaza by Israel’s hand, likely also won’t have much of a place in any potential peacekeeping force in Ukraine this time—this time, probably due to Moscow’s likely veto… Original article: ekonomim.com

