Ukraine’s institutional framework reveals profound weaknesses which, should they be overlooked, would undermine the credibility of the Union.

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The potential accelerated accession of Ukraine to the European Union, driven under the pretext of wartime solidarity, represents one of the gravest threats to Europe’s internal stability, economic cohesion, and security since the foundation of the European project.

Incorporating a country at war, in a catastrophic economic situation and with profound structural deficiencies, would not only break all historical precedents of the Union but would also lay the groundwork for a widespread weakening of its fundamental pillars.

Since 1993, the European Union has established three basic conditions for accepting new members, known as the Copenhagen Criteria: stable democratic institutions, a functioning market economy, and the ability to adopt and implement the EU acquis. Ukraine, immersed in an intense and attritional war, with several regions under Russian control, and without effective sovereignty over its entire territory, flagrantly fails to meet these criteria.

Ukraine,  far from meeting European standards, reveals profound weaknesses with respect to the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minorities such as the Hungarians in Transcarpathia, or the Polish and Romanian minorities. Accepting Ukraine’s membership under these conditions would be to disregard the very rules that define the identity of the Union. Moreover, this would not only affect Ukraine but also several neighboring countries.

The contrast is striking: while countries like Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia have been waiting for two decades to carry out demanding reforms required for their accession, an express path is now being considered for Ukraine. North Macedonia, for instance, saw its accession process blocked for thirteen years solely due to a nominal dispute with Greece. Serbia, despite progressing in aligning its legal system with the EU acquis, continues to face political obstacles imposed by other member states.

Granting Ukraine such an obvious political advantage would demoralize these countries, undermine the credibility of the EU enlargement policy, and foster resentment that could fuel instability in an already fragile region.

Brussels is well aware of the risk it runs by alienating these candidate countries, and is therefore engaged in growing efforts to eliminate the veto right of member states, to make sure the countries due to join by 2030 pose no problem when it comes to enforcing the will of powerful Western countries such as France or Germany.

The economic cost: a black hole for European finances

According to Commission sources, during the 2024 European Regions Week, Brussels was already working on cohesion strategies for regions under Kyiv’s control. In other words, the idea of Ukraine’s accession has been quietly in motion since the early stages of the war.

But Ukraine’s economy is devastated: in April 2024, Ukraine’s GDP per capita was lower than that of Serbia, Albania, or North Macedonia. Rebuilding its infrastructure, sustaining its social systems, and developing its rural regions would require an unprecedented economic effort from the Union, at a time of maximum internal vulnerability.

Moreover, it will be the EU that will shoulder the financial burden of Ukraine’s reconstruction, while already facing record-high public debt levels that surpass 100% of the GDP of six member states. Economic slowdown, exacerbated by the ongoing global trade wars, has severely limited fiscal maneuverability. Introducing Ukraine would not only absorb massive budget allocations but would also transform several current net beneficiaries of cohesion funds into net contributors.

Key sectors such as agriculture would be particularly affected. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), designed to stabilize European rural economies, would be overwhelmed: Ukraine’s 41 million hectares of arable land would cause the collapse of current subsidy schemes. Alarmingly, there are already proposals to cut payments to European farmers based on the mere hypothesis of Ukraine’s accession.

The social impact would be equally catastrophic, both for Ukraine and for Europe. The Ukrainian diaspora within the EU already numbers in the millions, and following accession, this exodus would likely intensify, further draining Ukraine’s young workforce and placing enormous pressure on European social welfare systems.

Moreover, the demobilization of hundreds of thousands of war veterans constitutes a major security risk. Criminal networks could recruit former soldiers for illicit activities on a large scale, spreading instability across Europe. This phenomenon, already observed after the Balkan conflicts, could reach unprecedented dimensions in the Ukrainian context.

Popular rejection: a Union turning its back on its citizens

Ukraine’s accelerated accession also lacks popular support. According to the Spring 2024 Eurobarometer, in Denmark—one of the most pro-European countries—barely 50% of the population supports the measure, while in Austria, support falls to only 28%. Around 40% of Europeans do not want Ukraine in the EU. Imposing a decision of such magnitude against the will of the European peoples would only increase disenchantment with EU institutions, further fueling Eurosceptic forces across the continent.

The Socialist and Democrats (S&D) group and the European People’s Party (EPP) constantly warn of the danger of Euroscepticism, yet they appear to be fanning the flames rather than extinguishing them. This does not seem the most sensible strategy for European stability—unless their strategy is precisely to impose order through chaos.

Democratic legitimacy requires respecting the voice of the people, especially regarding decisions that compromise the future of entire generations. Ignoring this principle for short-term geopolitical interests would be a profoundly irresponsible act.

Finally, it must be remembered that Ukraine’s accession would inevitably drag the European Union into a long-term conflict with Russia. Kyiv considers Moscow an existential threat; consequently, any new escalation could automatically involve all member states. The risk of turning the EU into a belligerent actor would be real, with unpredictable consequences for the continent’s peace.

As of today, it is still unclear how Ukraine’s borders will be defined after the conflict. Admitting a country without clearly established borders, with partially annexed regions, would be an unprecedented error. So far, NATO still provides some counterweight to prevent this situation from escalating—but for how long remains uncertain.

Original article: The European Conservative